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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONTROL OF MARKETING HOURS DECLARED A
MANAGEMENT FUNCTION
Jewel Tea Company v. Associated Food Retailers
331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964)
Chicago consumers may shop for food in any of more than 9,000
stores, many of which are open until 9 p.m. At 6 p.m., because of an
agreement with local butcher unions, the self-service meat counters are
dosed to all patrons. The sales ban originally included fish and frozen
poultry; however, to alleviate a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis delica-
tessen stores, defendant now permits fish and poultry to be sold after the
6 p.m. curfew. Plaintiff corporation owns and operates 196 food super-
markets in the Chicago area, the majority of which have self-service meat
counters. Industry-wide bargaining with defendant butcher unions is
apparently the rule. In 1958, plaintiff agreed to the closing provision,
protesting that it did so only under threat of strike, and because it stood
virtually alone in opposing the ban. Plaintiff then brought this action for
declaratory judgment outlawing the closing hours clause as a restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act.1 Jewel Tea also asked for an injunction and
treble damages. Defendant's demurrer was overruled, and the ruling ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 On remand, the district court
dismissed as to defendant Associated Food Retailers, holding that the
evidence did not support a finding that the food retailers had conspired
illegally to restrain trade.3 After all the evidence was in, the district court
also dismissed as to the defendant unions. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit unanimously reversed with a vigorous opinion.4
The question is familiar and troublesome: to what extent is labor
union activity subject to the antitrust laws? The question involves con-
siderable economic import and vital policy matters. It has historically been
a matter of "legal economics," as judges and legislatures have determined
how best to distribute economic power between labor and management
groups. Early labor organizers met unfriendly courts.5 When Congress
I Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-6
(1958).
2 274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960).
3 215 F. Supp. 837 (1962).
4 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964).
G Early union activity was treated as a criminal conspiracy to destroy both the
employer's property and competition among workers. See the New York Cordwainer's
Case, People v. Melvin, 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 262 (1810). When the criminal
sanctions were removed, there remained formidable remedies in tort as well as the
favorite remedy of employers, the private injunction.
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declared that big business trusts were not to be countenanced, the courts
did not hesitate to apply the broad language of the Sherman Act to the
labor movement as well.6 This was done despite legislative history tending
to exempt the labor unions from the operation of the act.7 Sections 6 and
20 of the Clayton Act s were thought to be labor's emancipation from the
Sherman Act, but the courts were quick to dash that notion.9 It took the
unequivocal language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 10 to provide a measure
of immunity from employer's injunction suits.
In the early 1940's the outlines of labor's immunity from antitrust
suits began to emerge with Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader" and United
6 Cf. Lowe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
7 21 Cong. Rec. 2457, 2611 (1890), includes the following remark by Senator
Sherman:
I do not think it necessary, but at the same time to avoid any confusion [sub-
mit the following to come at the end of the first section] provided, That this
act shall not be construed to apply to any arrangements, agreements, or com-
binations between laborers made with the view of lessening the number of
hours of labor or of increasing their wages; nor to any arrangements, agree-
ments, or combinations among persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture
made with the view of enhancing the price of agricultural or horticultural
products.
The motion passed.
7 Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor ... organizations, instituted for the pur-
poses of mutual help . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.
§ 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States ... in any case between an employer or employees, or between
employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed
and persons seeking employment, involving . . . a dispute concerning terms
or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury
to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for
which injury there is no adequate remedy at la.... And no such restraining
order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons from terminating any
relation of employment or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or
from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to
do ... (emphasis supplied.)
9 The older judges in particular were loath to enforce the new "labor bill of
rights." See McCullough, J., in United States v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 49 F. Supp.
475 (D. Ore. 1943). See also Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
10 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101.
11 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), held that the word "com-
merce" in the Sherman Act was meant merely to relate the prohibited restraint of
trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes. Apex also held that § 1 of the
act made criminal only the common law version of restraint of competition, restraint
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States v. Hutcheson.12 From Hutcheson on, it has been settled that unions
may control market activities, and the test may be this broad: if the activ-
ity is not enjoinable under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it is impliedly lawful.
Then followed Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3 IBEW, 3 which purports
to set forth the limit of union antitrust liability. In Allen-Bradley, local
electrical workers' unions combined with employers to monopolize the New
York market in electrical machinery. Foreign manufacturers could easily
have competed with the ballooned prices which were an obvious result of
the market restraint. The Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws
had been violated, and that the conspiracy was not shielded because the
unions might have monopolized the labor market acting alone.
Essential to the holding in Allen-Bradley was the combination of em-
ployee group and employer group. What constitutes such a combination?
Some courts have held that unwilling acquiescence alone does not establish
the collaboration. 14 Another court asserts that such a combination exists
when a non-labor group agrees to a union demand.Y' It was not made clear
in the instant case which theory underpins the court of appeals' decision,
but the facts of the case do not suggest that Jewel Tea was willing to enter
the agreement, nor that all members of the retailers' association were willing
to continue what they considered a costly restraint. Yet the better view
may require willing agreement between employer groups and union groups
to make the Allen-Bradley doctrine operative.
Defendant contended that the rule of reason, as announced in Board
of Trade v. United States,16 should be applied in the instant case. The
test was stated:
The legality of an agreement or regulation does not depend upon
whether or not it restrains competition, but the true test is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and perhaps
thereby promotes, competition, or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition.17
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument Is saying that Board of Trade
involved a regulation promotive of competition on balance, whereas no
such claim could be made for the marketing hours restriction. The rule of
reason need not be read so narrowly. Rather here, it may be read to permit
those restraints which neither "suppress" nor "destroy" competition. Not
upon competition in the marketing of goods and services. This brought transportation
strikes, previously outlawed, within the labor exemption.
12 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
'3 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
14 See United States v. Bay Area Painters & Decorators Joint Comm., Inc., 49
F. Supp. 733 (D. Cal. 1943).
15 McHugh v. United States, 230 F2d 252 (lst Cir. 1956).
16 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
17 Id. at 238.
18 Which the District Court accepted, and upon which, inter alia, its determina-
tion was made.
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only is the rule of reason inapplicable, said the court, but the restriction
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act.
The court further said:
As long as all rights of employees are recognized ... by the em-
ployer, including the number of hours per day that anyone shall
be required to work, any agreement by a labor union, acting in
concert with business competitors of the employer, designed
to interfere with his operation of a retail business, engaged in
handling products in the course of interstate commerce, is a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act, and not entitled to the exemption .... 19
Such a broad test is hardly compelled, for it ignores the import of a vast
body of labor relations legislation which preserves bargaining rights to
both union and management.20 The unions were surely free to bargain
for wages, hours, and conditions of employment and it is at least arguable
that they believed they were bargaining over hours in the instant case,
since defendants maintained that butchers would be needed to staff even
self-service meat counters.
The case makes appropriate the holding in San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garrmon,21 which stands for the proposition that whenever sec-
tions 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act are arguably involved,
both federal and state courts must defer to the original jurisdiction of the
NLRB. The agreement under scrutiny here may constitute an illegal
agreement under section 8(e), which proscribes agreements to cease or
refrain from handling the products of any other employer. It may con-
stitute protected employee activity under the broad language of section
7. In either case, the union is entitled to have its position examined
by the NLRB if that agency will take jurisdiction. Should the NLRB
refuse, then in theory section 14 preserves alternative remedies.
An interesting byproduct of the instant case is the proprietary func-
tion doctrine, perhaps referred to more traditionally as management
function doctrine. Unions may not bargain in this area, said the court.
It does seem that union members are here attempting to "back in" to a
position of authority traditionally preserved for managers, and there may
be little logic in protecting such usurpation. The conflict of apparently
legitimate rights of managers with the newer economic powers in union
hands led Archibald Cox to presage the likely result in these terms:
State courts, moved by hard cases, began to hold that strikes for
extraordinarily obnoxious objectives did not give rise to a labor
19 Jewel Tea Co. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., 331
F.2d 547, 549 (1964).
20 Labor Management Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449, 9 U.S.C. § 151
(1935); Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 156, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1947); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519
(1959).
21 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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dispute within the local anti-injunction laws, and finding no place
to stop, ended by reading the full common law objectives test
back into statutes intended to abolish it ... The suggested ap-
proach would necessarily lead to a new objectives test phrased
in the language of management functions as opposed to terms and
conditions on which employees may properly bargain, i.e., it
would remove from the immunity of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
any labor activity aimed at affecting a "management function"
whether or not it is directed toward interference by labor with
competition in the product market.22
The point is well taken. Here we have a willing seller, and apparently
willing buyers, kept apart by the unions for reasons which must seem pale
to the layman who wants meat on his evening table. Furthermore, the
plaintiff showed by the testimony of a union official that the unions wished
to protect the small less competitive butcher shops from supermarket
competition, so that each union member might save enough money to open
his own shop. Using closing hours to protect one class of retailers against
another is not permissible.2 3 But can it be categorically stated that unions
may never bargain as to marketing hours for any reason whatsoever? Many
matters once considered management prerogatives are now routinely bar-
gained upon. Included are the hiring of unneeded men, determining hours
of employment, use of labor-saving devices, even the very recognition of
labor unions as lawful bargaining agents. The legitimate objects of
unions under the Wagner Act24 have changed, 25 and we may reasonably
expect further change. Union bargaining objects may be expanded in the
future, since the field is not to be limited to the situation existing at the time
the Act was passed.26 The union objects might conversely be narrowed, but
if narrowed through continued judicial use of the antitrust device, a uni-
form national labor policy will be a likely casualty.
22 Cox, "Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis," 104 Pa. L.Rev.
252, 269 (1955).
23 United States v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (1945).
24 Supra note 20.
25 Matter of Fieldler, 55 N.L.R.B. 678 (1944).
26 Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F2d 875 (lst Cir. 1949).
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